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ETHICS FOR EXAMINERS
Daniel J. Bussel*
INTRODUCTION
I recently assessed the emergence of a new type of bankruptcy examiner
employing inquisitorial methods of investigation in a few recent large
Chapter 11 reorganizations.1 There are many reasons to commend this
development: it promises renewed emphasis on transparency,2 superior
factfinding capability,3 use of nonpartisan experts,4 freedom from artificial
evidentiary constraints,5 and a counterweight to imbalances among the
parties in terms of resources and other strategic advantages and
disadvantages.6 These inquisitorial methods can promote the fairness and
legitimacy of the bankruptcy reorganization process in certain large cases
implicating the public interest.7
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Professors Sung Hui Kim, Kenneth N. Klee,
Laurel Terry, and Dennis J. Connolly, Esq., provided thoughtful comments on early drafts of
this Article. I am especially grateful for the editorial support, careful research, and
substantive suggestions of my research assistant Michael Morris-Nussbaum, UCLA School
of Law, Class of 2017. I also thank Fordham University School of Law, the Fordham Law
Review, and the participants in Lawyering in the Regulatory State for the excellent and
helpful discussion of these issues when I presented an early draft of this Article there. For an
overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword: Lawyering in the Regulatory
State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016).
1. Daniel J. Bussel, A Third Way: Examiners As Inquisitors, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J.
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
2. Id. (manuscript at 72).
3. Id. (manuscript at 69).
4. See id. (manuscript at 68–69).
5. See id. (manuscript at 68–72).
6. Id. (manuscript at 69–71).
7. Id. (manuscript at 70, 75–76); see also Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Second Report of
the Select Advisory Committee on Business Reorganization, 60 BUS. LAW. 277, 281–325
(2004); Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 59 (2010) (“We should
use examiners more, but under the ‘right’ circumstances, and for the ‘right’ reasons.”); Ryan
M. Murphy, Does the Recent String of Examiner Appointments in Delaware Represent a Sea
Change in Approach or Merely a Perfect Storm of Cases?, 2011 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 04-2;
Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Examining the Examiners, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34
(2005); Clifford J. White III & Walter W. Theus, Jr., Chapter 11 Trustees and Examiners
After BAPCPA, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289, 289 (2006) (“The thesis of this Article is that
trustees and examiners can serve creditor, shareholder, and public interests by promoting the
efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of complex [C]hapter 11 cases.”); Jonathan C.
Lipson & Christopher Fiore Marotta, Examining Success (Temple Univ. Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 2015-17, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2568178 [https://perma.cc/
5SLY-DV4P]; RAMONA D. ELLIOTT ET AL., AM. BANKR. INST., EXAMINERS: THEIR USE,
MISUSE AND CREATIVE APPLICATIONS (2011) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Most
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But for these new inquisitorial examinations, bankruptcy courts, like
other American courts, would continue to resolve disputes through
adversary litigation or settlement. Both the Federal Rules of Evidence and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in modern bankruptcy
litigation.8 American-style civil litigation is expensive, time consuming,
wasteful, often winner-take-all, and constrained by procedures and biases
that may inhibit the quest for both truth and justice.9 Although the
Bankruptcy Code10 authorizes (indeed, in some instances, directs)
investigations11 prior to the commencement of adversary litigation, these
investigations are ordinarily conducted by trustees and official creditors’
committees.12 Unlike examiners, neither trustees nor committees are
neutrals charged with finding truth. They occupy adversarial roles and
must advance the interests of particular constituencies. Trustees of
insolvent estates owe fiduciary obligations to general creditors and are
duty-bound to maximize the value of the estate. They are not neutrals as to
any claims or defenses that affect the estate. Indeed, trustees’ personal
economic interests are purposely aligned with the goal of estate

recently, the American Bankruptcy Institute proposed to subsume examiners within the
broader role of “Estate Neutral” appointed for cause at the discretion of the bankruptcy court
to potentially assume broad portfolio activities now performed by examiners, examiners with
expanded powers, trustees, and other officers. See AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY
THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 32–37 (2014)
[hereinafter ABI REPORT].
8. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9017 incorporates the Federal Rules of
Evidence and related portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with
evidentiary matters into bankruptcy proceedings. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017. In adversary
proceedings in bankruptcy court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with relatively minor
variations, apply through Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See id.
7001. In other contested matters, unless the bankruptcy court otherwise directs, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 17, 21, 25–37, 41, 42, 52, 54–56, 64, 69, and 71 are incorporated
by reference. See id. 9014(c).
9. These drawbacks, if you will, to the adversary process have been extensively
remarked upon by many others. See, e.g., Addresses of Learned Hand, in 3 LECTURES ON
LEGAL TOPICS 89, 105 (1926) (“I must say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond
almost anything short of sickness or death.”); Jeb Barnes, Bankrupt Bargain? Bankruptcy
Reform & the Politics of Adversarial Legalism, 13 J. L. & POL. 893 (1997); Jerome Frank,
“Short of Sickness and Death”: A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism, 26
N.Y.U. L. REV. 545 (1951); Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism & American
Government, 10 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 369 (1991); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1926)
(reprinting Pound’s address at the twenty-ninth meeting of the American Bar Association in
1906). Perhaps the most telling critique is Trollope’s brilliant nintenth-century fictional
effort, which still resonates today. See generally ANTHONY TROLLOPE, ORLEY FARM (1862).
10. See generally 11 U.S.C. (2012).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 341(d) (providing mandatory debtor examination); id. § 704(a)(4)
(explaining investigative duties of Chapter 7 trustee); id. § 1103(c)(2) (describing powers of
a creditors’ committee to include investigation); id. § 1106(a)(3) (describing investigative
duties of Chapter 11 trustee).
12. See id. § 343 (providing for examination of debtor); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004
(authorizing examinations of any entity by compulsory process on any matter which may
affect administration of the estate including matters pertaining to the operation of the
business or any reorganization plan).
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maximization.13 Similarly, creditors’ committees consist of creditors from
particular interested constituencies who serve and negotiate on behalf of
those constituencies.14 As I have noted elsewhere, in the hands of a
committee, investigations are generally used strategically to advance the
committee’s position in plan negotiations.15 Unsurprisingly, trustee- and
committee-led investigations quickly and naturally fall into the adversarial
model.
Settlement is the common answer to concerns about the cost and efficacy
of adversary litigation. The Bankruptcy Code facilitates settlement in
numerous ways.16
But settlements in bankruptcy avoid assigning
culpability, pretermit fact-finding, and may manipulate consent doctrines in
ways that undermine legitimacy in the eyes of the public and aggrieved
constituencies.17
Inquisitorial investigation sidesteps many of the pitfalls of adversary
litigation and settlement.18 Inquisitorial investigation, however, also comes
with potential costs: large fees and expenses for the examiner and his
professionals of course,19 but also lost focus,20 due process concerns,21
delay,22 and the risk of strategic manipulation of inquisitorial methods by
the parties or examiner.23 Infamously, inquisitorial process employed by
such institutions as the Star Chamber and the Spanish Inquisition has been
at least as susceptible to abuse as the adversarial process.24 Abuse of
inquisitorial methods in a major reorganization case could easily undermine
the legitimacy garnered through the recent spate of successful inquisitorial
examinerships, or even nip innovative inquisitorial investigation in the bud,
leaving adversary litigation and settlement as the only realistic choices for
resolving matters.

13. Trustees are paid a sliding scale commission on creditor distributions up to $1
million and “reasonable compensation not to exceed 3 percent” of distributions in excess of
$1 million. 11 U.S.C. § 326(a). In 2005, § 330 was amended to provide that the court shall
treat trustee compensation “as a commission.” Id. § 330(a)(7). The trend in the cases
thereafter has been to award the statutory percentage unless there are extraordinary
circumstances. See In re Salgado-Nava, 473 B.R. 911, 918 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (equating
trustee compensation with contingent or fixed fee counsel under 11 U.S.C. § 328); see also 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 326.02[1][a] (16th ed. 2014) (discussing division in post-2005
case law on court’s discretion to reduce trustee’s fee below statutory percentage).
14. See generally Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors’
Committees, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1547, 1561–70 (1996).
15. Id. at 1629.
16. Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 663, 689 (2011).
17. See id. at 735.
18. Bussel, supra note 1 (manuscript at 66–72).
19. Id. (manuscript at 77–78). Depending on how events unfold, these costs may be in
addition to, rather than in lieu of, other professional fees. Id.
20. Id. (manuscript at 78–79).
21. Id. (manuscript at 82–83).
22. Id. (manuscript at 77–78).
23. Id. (manuscript at 69–71).
24. Id. (manuscript at 14–15).
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So far, examiner appointments in major Chapter 11 cases have been few
and far between and reserved for the most elite lawyers.25 Recent
examiners conducting inquisitorial investigations have been self-conscious
in breaking new methodological ground, zealous in protecting their own
reputations for integrity and good judgment, and cautious in their use of
inquisitorial methods. Their investigations have been remarkably well
executed and yielded successful results.26 But as inquisitorial investigation
becomes more common and examiners more comfortable in the exercise of
these powers, inevitably controversy and perceived or actual abuses will
arise out of such methods.
To date, examiners have self-regulated, or have been regulated by their
appointing bankruptcy court, on an ad hoc basis, principally through their
appointment orders, subsequent “comfort orders” requested by the
examiners themselves, or the statutorily required review of the fee
applications of the examiner and his professionals.27 No ex ante code of
conduct binding on, or even addressed to, examiners exists. To be sure,
examiners and their supervising bankruptcy courts have looked to what past
examiners have done, and, being lawyers, they are familiar with the
standards of behavior required of lawyers and judges.28
But examiners are not advocates—they have no client, and they do not
participate in an adversary process. These are all indispensable background
assumptions for lawyers’ codes of ethics.29 Judges’ ethical codes are also
framed against a background assumption that the judge will be a passive
fact finder reacting to party-discovered and party-presented evidence in an
adversary framework.30 Mediators have begun to develop precatory ethical

25. Id. (manuscript at 29–30).
26. Id. (manuscript at 55, 62, 64–66) (discussing recent cases).
27. 11 U.S.C. §§ 330–331 (2012). Note that unlike other estate professionals employed
by a trustee, debtor-in-possession, or statutory committee, no alternative mechanism for
preapproval of contractual fee arrangements exists for an examiner or his professionals. Cf.
id. § 328.
28. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES (2014); SUPREME COURT OF CAL., CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
(2015); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (2014); N.Y. STATE RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT (2013); ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010); CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2007).
29. The first eighteen rules in the Model Code, see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY r.r. 1.1–.18, define the ethical boundaries of the lawyer-client relationship,
while only one rule relates to a lawyer’s role as a third-party neutral. See MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 2.4 (Counselor: Lawyer Serving As Third-Party Neutral). See
generally Monroe H. Freedman, What Does the Lawyer Really “Know”: The Epistemology
of Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 51–59 (1975); David
Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83–122 (1983).
30. Of course, for at least a generation now, we have understood that modern American
judging is not wholly passive. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 374 (1982). Nevertheless, the judicial canons of ethics are still drawn with the
traditional passive model firmly in mind, and even the most managerial of judges in our
system avoid affirmatively and directly conducting ex parte fact investigation in the manner
described here.
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guidelines for themselves,31 but these guidelines are less generally
accepted,32 and they also speak to a professional with a very different role.
Mediators endeavor to resolve disputes through settlement; they do not
engage in independent fact-finding or promote truth or transparency.
Lawyers, judges, and mediators’ ethical codes provide scant guidance for
the inquisitorial examiner.
The closest familiar analogy to an inquisitorial examiner in our legal
system is the criminal prosecutor.33 Prosecutors and grand juries do
employ inquisitorial methods and operate without a client in the usual
sense.34 But prosecutors operate in a criminal law context foreign to the
31. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM. ARB. ASS’N, ABA
& ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RES. 2005).
32. See James K. L. Lawrence, Lying, Misrepresenting, Puffing and Bluffing: Legal,
Ethical and Professional Standards for Negotiators and Mediation Advocates, 29 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 35 (2014) (describing ethical complexities presented during mediation in
some contexts); Fran L. Tetunic, Demystifying Florida Mediator Ethics: The Good, the Bad,
and the Unseemly, 32 NOVA L. REV. 205, 211–13 (2007); Andrea C. Yang, Ethics Codes for
Mediator Conduct: Necessary but Still Insufficient, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229 (2009);
see also Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
691, 692–97, 701–06 (2001) (discussing the ethics of facilitated negotiation and of lawyers
participating in mediation); Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Practitioner’s Corner:
Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 87,
95–99 (1997) (arguing that Model Standards failed to achieve drafters’ goal of serving as a
guide for mediator conduct, informing mediating parties, and promoting confidence in
mediation as a process of dispute resolution); Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice,
Give Thanks, and Sing: ABA, ACR, and AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct
for Mediators, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 195, 201 (2006) (charting the development of the
literature surrounding mediation ethics).
33. Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include
the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 930 (1996);
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 168–69
(2004) (noting inquisitorial nature of federal criminal prosecution and suggesting “insights
from the inquisitorial model provide a starting point for redressing the most pernicious
effects of our quasi-inquisitorial federal criminal justice system”); see Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (Special Duties of
Prosecutors); Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second Annual
Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in NAT’L COLL. OF DIST. ATTORNEYS,
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PROSECUTION 2 (John J. Doglass ed., 1977).
34. Conventionally, American prosecutors are said to represent the “State,” the
“Government,” or, most generically, the “People,” but prosecutors’ offices are typically
structured to act independently of other government officials. Unlike lawyers with “real”
clients, and very much like bankruptcy examiners, “the only mind the prosecutor must make
up is his own.” John S. Edwards, Professional Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecutor, 17
U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 513 (1983). Prosecutors often do identify with several constituencies:
crime victims, law enforcement agencies and personnel with whom they work closely, and
other officials. A prosecutor may even in some senses “represent” these constituents in the
criminal process, but certainly as a formal and an ethical matter they are not his clients, and
they can neither direct nor discharge him. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS std. 26-1.2(a) (2014) (reaffirming the prosecutor’s role as a
“member of an independent institution the primary duty of which is to seek justice,” but
noting the prosecutor’s client is “the public, not particular government agencies or victims”).
But see Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1453, 1462 (2000) (noting that ethical rules governing prosecutors sometimes
constrain prosecutorial advocacy but “at times the standards applicable to them are more
adversarial than those for civil advocates”); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents,
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bankruptcy examiner. Grand juries and criminal investigations are far from
transparent.35 Moreover, prosecutors ordinarily act within a bureaucratic
hierarchy and political system that imposes internal and external constraints
on them;36 they have special privileges and obligations that come with
holding the uniquely coercive power of the criminal law in their hands;37
and unlike examiners, they act also as advocates or modified advocates with
respect to the subject matter of their investigations when adversarial
proceedings commence.38
The thesis of this Article, therefore, is that the inquisitorial bankruptcy
examiner is sui generis in our system39 and that he faces unique ethical
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 754 (2003) (arguing prosecutors
and agents are members of a “working group,” with each side monitoring the other).
Interestingly, the United Kingdom has long followed a different model where the prosecutor
is, in essence, counsel for the police. Flowers, supra note 33, at 928–29. Given these distinct
prosecutorial roles in the United Kingdom and the United States, some commentators
suggest that the lineage of the American prosecutor is properly traced to the European
inquisitorial tradition rather than the English common law adversarial model. See LEWIS
KATZ, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES 16–17 (1972); see also
Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice As a Guide to American Law Reform: How
Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV.
539, 542–43 (1990) (suggesting that there are similarities between the American criminal
justice system and the European inquisitorial tradition).
35. Federal grand jurors are prohibited from disclosing matters occurring before the
grand jury, as are any government attorney or others present at the proceeding. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B). The secrecy of grand jury proceedings has been zealously guarded to
ensure free deliberations, prevent subornation of perjury or witness tampering, encourage
disclosure by those who may have information relevant to the crime, and protect targets from
disclosure of the fact that they were under investigation. See James F. Holderman & Charles
B. Redfern, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System Revisited, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 527, 557–58 n.165 (2006) (quoting United States v. John Doe,
Inc., 481 U.S. 102, 110 (1987)).
36. See Richman, supra note 34, at 756–57. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL (1997).
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.r. 3.6, 3.8; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS std. 1.2(d)(iv) (describing a
prosecutor’s duty of confidentiality:
“The prosecutor should [during criminal
investigation] . . . seek in most circumstances to maintain the secrecy and confidentiality of
criminal investigations”).
38. An examiner may not serve as the trustee or counsel to the trustee in any case in
which he previously served as examiner. See 11 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012) (disqualifying
examiner from serving as trustee); id. § 327(f) (disqualifying examiner from employment by
trustee). Ordinarily, an examiner lacks standing to assert estate causes of action. In a few
cases, courts nevertheless have authorized examiners to assert estate causes of action they
found to have merit in the course of their investigation. See In re Carnegie Int’l Corp., 51
B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1984) (authorizing examiner to sue on behalf of the estate
after filing of examiner’s report); Kit Weitnauer, Should an Examiner Prosecute Claims? A
Response to Proposed Changes to the Role of Examiner Contained in the Second Report of
SABRE, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, 76 (2005). This practice seems inconsistent with the
spirit, if not the letter, of §§ 321(b) and 327(f), which evince a concern that an examiner
might have an economic incentive to recommend appointment of a trustee if he were eligible
to fill that office or serve as counsel to the trustee. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 13, ¶ 321. Similar considerations suggest that an examiner should not be able to profit
personally from the prosecution of any cause of action he is charged with investigating and
assessing.
39. Although at present it has no generally accepted regulatory framework, international
arbitration may provide another, especially apt, analog to the inquisitorial bankruptcy
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quandaries and considerations, which require a code of ethics tailored to his
role if he is to achieve fully the promise of improving Chapter 11 through
the introduction of inquisitorial investigative methods. This Article is my
attempt to point the way toward guidelines that will regulate the conduct of
examiners to mitigate real, potential, and perceived abuses.
Part I describes in broad terms how an inquisitorial investigation in
Chapter 11 might proceed, abstracting from the experiences of examiners in
the In re Tribune Co.,40 In re Dynegy, Inc.,41 and In re Residential Capital,
LLC42 (“ResCap”)—cases that I have discussed at length elsewhere.43 Part
II identifies the ethical framework within which inquisitorial examiners
properly work. Part III addresses selected issues and offers more specific
suggestions for regulating the conduct of examiners to mitigate abuse and
further the legitimacy of such investigations.
I. THE INQUISITORIAL EXAMINER
Modern inquisitorial civil process does not exclude the parties in interest
from participating in the investigation. Rather, it looks to the parties to help
frame the issues and gather the evidence.44 Accordingly, after employing
examiner. Scholars have long noted that the adversarial and inquisitorial traditions have
been somewhat ambivalently and imprecisely commingled in the international arbitration
context. William Karl Wilburn, Mix and Match: Divergent Legal Traditions in International
Arbitration, 43 MD. B.J. 4, 9–10 (2010) (“It is imperative that a party knows under which
tradition the arbitration will be conducted—or whether the arbitral process is a hybrid—
because this will determine many aspects of the hearing and arbitration
generally . . . . Often, rules of the administrative organization may not specifically refer to
‘adversarial’ or ‘inquisitorial’—more likely, these differences are only apparent from a close
examination of the rules and their interrelationship. . . . The nationality and training of the
arbitrators may also dictate how they will conduct the arbitration. For example, an arbitrator
from a Civil Code country may tend to ask questions of the parties and the witnesses during
the arbitration proceeding, whereas an American arbitrator may be more inclined to allow
the parties’ counsel to ask questions, interfering only when the arbitrator feels that he or she
requires information not addressed by counsel’s questioning or the evidence presented.”);
see also Siegfried H. Elsing & John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law-Civil Law
Divide in Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT’L 59 (2002); Urs Martin Laeuchli, Civil and Common
Law: Contrast and Synthesis in International Arbitration, 62 DISP. RESOL. J. 81 (2007);
Hyun Song Shin, Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration, 29 RAND J.
ECON. 378 (1998). Because arbitration is a creature of contract, parties have a special
opportunity in this realm to define the investigative powers and protocols of the investigating
neutral, though it appears that to date little thought has been given to this possibility. To the
extent that the bankruptcy model described above is refined and proves successful, one can
hope that sophisticated parties may by contract begin to consciously export that model into
international arbitration.
40. No. 08-BR-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 8, 2008).
41. No. 11-BR-38111 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011).
42. No. 12-BR-12020 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012).
43. Bussel, supra note 1 (manuscript at 44–56) (discussing Tribune); id. (manuscript at
56–59) (discussing Dynegy); id. (manuscript at 60–63) (discussing ResCap).
44. Id. (manuscript at 20–24) (describing role of parties in modern European civil
practice); see also Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181,
1260–73 (2005) (discussing modern French civil practice); Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems
in Europe and the United States, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 61, 69 (2003) (describing
modern German civil practice).
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his own legal counsel (and perhaps financial or other neutral experts),45 a
newly minted examiner following the Tribune model would convene a
meeting with the principal parties in interest and their counsel to discuss his
proposed work plan, the parties’ role in the investigation and the examiner’s
expectations for cooperation, and issues of confidentiality and privilege.
The parties would then submit their views in writing on these procedural
issues, as well as the claims and defenses that they believe should be
investigated and assessed. The examiner, with his counsel and financial
advisors, would develop a formal work plan (including a nonbinding
budget) for an investigation sufficient to enable him to assess the strength
of the parties’ contested claims and defenses and address the legal and
factual disputes preliminarily identified. The work plan would be filed with
the court and available to the parties and the public.
The parties would then submit to the examiner comprehensive legal,
financial, and factual analyses of the matters under investigation in the form
of opening and reply briefs. As in mediation proceedings, the briefs would
be served on the examiner and the other parties, but not filed with the court,
along with any documents, depositions, or analyses bearing on the factual
or legal subject matter of the investigation. The parties would also identify
prospective witnesses and suggest discovery to the examiner. These
suggestions would not bind the examiner, but might provide a starting point
for his investigation.
Authorized by the supervising court to employ compulsory process
coextensive with the supervising court’s jurisdiction, the examiner would
then issue subpoenae duces tecum for documents and begin his witness
interviews. As the principal fact finder, the examiner would attend all key
interviews in person or by videoconference to evaluate witness demeanor
and credibility, and he would actively participate in questioning. Interviews
would ordinarily be under oath. The witness might have his own lawyer
present but the parties would otherwise be excluded from the interviews.
45. No individual alone could possibly conduct a full investigation of a complex set of
claims and defenses arising in a large Chapter 11 case. In the large cases I am talking about
here, the examiner’s “legal counsel” operates essentially as his staff in conducting the
investigation, although it may also incidentally offer him legal advice regarding the exercise
of his powers and responsibilities and represent him before the bankruptcy court in these
collateral matters. It is a bit awkward to force an essentially principal-staff relationship into
an attorney-client mold, but that is how these examiners have proceeded. Doing so avoids
having to construct a special set of privileges and duties as between the examiner and his
staff; the attorney-client mold serves well enough when the examiner undertakes the
essentially legal responsibility of conducting an investigation. I note, however, that unlike
the case of debtors and trustees, the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly contemplate that an
examiner may retain professionals. In re Southmark Corp., 113 B.R. 280, 281 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1990) (“The [Bankruptcy] Code does not specifically authorize an examiner to retain
professional persons to assist in the performance of the examiner’s duties. . . . The court
may, however, issue any order necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the
Code.”); In re Tighe Mercantile, Inc., 62 B.R. 995, 1000 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986) (“This
Court holds that in appropriate circumstances, a bankruptcy court may rely on [11 U.S.C.]
§ 105(a) [bankruptcy court power to issue any order necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code] to authorize examiners to employ professional
persons.”).
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Interviews would not be traditional adversary depositions.
No
evidentiary objections to questions or lines of inquiry would be made (or
waived), save only assertions of privilege, which if not satisfactorily
resolved informally between the examiner and the witness, might be
submitted to the court for a ruling. Unlike a deposition, witness
examinations would be informal (albeit under oath and recorded) with the
examiner, examiner’s counsel, witness, and witness’s counsel engaging in
colloquy, narrative exposition, and posing questions and offering
clarifications under the examiner’s general direction and control.
Contending parties and their lawyers, however, would not attend the
interviews or have any right to have their suggested lines of inquiry
pursued. The examiner might also interview multiple witnesses testifying
on the same basic issues together at the same time to permit interchange and
discussion between the witnesses, especially in order to clarify conflicting
expert testimony regarding technical matters such as valuation.46 Witnesses
might be reinterviewed as necessary as the investigation proceeds.
Meanwhile, the examiner’s financial advisor, working with his counsel,
would develop any necessary financial analysis of the issues presented—for
example, disputed questions relating to solvency, valuation, and relevant
industry and general economic conditions, building on whatever prior work
the parties and their financial advisors had made available to the
examiner.47

46. Kenneth Klee employed this device in Tribune. Bussel, supra note 1 (manuscript at
51). A version of this technique of concurrently examining multiple witnesses (known
colloquially as “hot-tubbing”) is now in wide use in Australia, as a means of tempering some
of the worst excesses of the adversary presentation of expert testimony. See e.g., Federal
Court of Australia Rules 2011 (Cth) r.r. 23.12–.13; MICHAEL LEGG, CASE MANAGEMENT AND
COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION 115 (Federation Press 2011); Gary Edmond, Merton and the Hot
Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence in Australian Civil Procedure, 72 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 182–86 (2009). The practice appears to be spreading to international
arbitration. See Doug Jones, Party Appointed Expert Witnesses in International Arbitration:
A Protocol at Last, 24 ARB. INT’L 1, 146–48 (2008) (“Hot tubbing is frequently used in
international arbitration hearings. Given the more flexible and informal nature of
international arbitration, it is probably better suited to arbitral proceedings than traditional
litigious methods of calling expert evidence.”). It may even make it to the great bastion of
adversary practice here in the United States. DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN &
JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 11.5, at 498 (2d ed.
2002) (suggesting that trial courts “[p]ermit experts from both sides not only to communicate
with one another, but to testify concurrently, sitting together on a panel in which the various
experts hear each other’s statements, comment on them, and possibly ask questions of each
other”).
47. This use of neutral financial experts differs dramatically from usual American
practice in which the parties separately engage competing experts to work with the legal
team of the side engaging them, produce competing reports, and then separately testify
subject to cross-examination. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly authorize
the court to select and engage (at the parties’ expense) an independent expert, FED. R. EVID.
706, this power is rarely invoked. See Jennifer Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship &
Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1021 n.31 (2008); see also Andrew W.
Jurs, Questions from the Bench and Independent Experts: A Study of the Practices of State
Court Judges, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 47, 51–52 (2012) (“Regarding use of independent experts
with Rule 706, 10 [percent] use the technique in cases with various types of expert
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In the assessment phase of the investigation, the examiner, with his
advisors, would weigh the relative positions of the parties and analyze the
estate’s potential remedies and the resulting effect on various creditor
constituencies. In Tribune, for example, the examiner set out his
independent merits conclusion as to each issue on the following continuum:
(1)
highly likely, (2)
reasonably likely, (3)
somewhat likely,
(4) equipoise,48 (5) somewhat unlikely, (6) reasonably unlikely, and
(7) highly unlikely.49 Findings and conclusions on this spectrum were
supported by a four-volume report, containing more than 1400 pages of
factual narrative and legal analysis, with 4600 footnotes.50 In addition to
referencing Klee’s witness interviews, the report cited some six hundred
case authorities and 1100 exhibits in support of its findings and
conclusions.51
The examiner would file a comprehensive, public report with the
bankruptcy court, thus concluding the investigation. As I have previously
suggested,52 in subsequent judicial proceedings, this report should be
viewed as the equivalent of a report and recommendation filed by a
bankruptcy judge in connection with a noncore matter.53
II. ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
I view the core of the inquisitorial examiner’s role as publicly, honestly,
and fully setting forth his findings and opinions in writing, following
diligent investigation into the matters assigned to him by the court. Unlike
the zealous advocate, an examiner has no client from whom he takes
direction and to whom he owes undivided loyalty. Unlike a judge, he does
not preside passively over an adversary contest from which truth will
hopefully emerge; he actively seeks out the truth with the assistance of his
own staff.54 Unlike a mediator, he is not vested in obtaining party consent
to a settlement; settlement—if it occurs—is merely incidental to his primary
mission of bringing the operative facts to light and furnishing an expert
assessment of their legal implications.
testimony, 16 [percent] would use it only in cases with complex expert testimony, and 74
[percent] would not appoint an expert under Rule 706.”).
48. There is some ambiguity in the Tribune Report’s use of “equipoise.” In most
instances, context suggests that “equipoise” is a determination that after full investigation,
Klee found the matter evenly balanced and its resolution essentially a coin-flip. In other
instances, however, the Klee Report suggests that matters outside the scope of the
investigation were treated as in equipoise. Correspondence with Lee R. Bogdanoff, Esq.
(Jan. 7, 2016) (on file with author).
49. In re Tribune Company, No. 08-BR-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 3, 2010).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Bussel, supra note 1 (manuscript at 94–95 & nn.295–96) and accompanying
text.
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2012). Although such reports are subject to de novo
review in the federal district court, such review is generally conducted on the written record
compiled below and may not, as a practical matter, differ significantly from ordinary
appellate review. Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority and Precedent in Interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1068 n.28 (1994).
54. But see supra note 45.
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Although an examiner is neither advocate, nor judge, nor mediator, he
shares attributes with each of them. Like the advocate, he uses the tools of
compulsory process to obtain the facts and his legal training to analyze and
opine on the law. Like the judge, he seeks to determine impartially the
facts and apply the law. Like the mediator, he operates largely outside of
the due process constraints of the adversary system. And an examiner, like
these other legal professionals, is expected to be free of conflicts of interest
with respect to the matter for which he has been engaged.
In seeking the truth, the examiner must:









remain neutral and unbiased;
treat the parties and witnesses fairly, honestly, and consistently
with their constitutional and legal rights;
provide the parties ample opportunity to inform the investigation
with evidence and argument of their own;
diligently seek out relevant evidence;
obtain unbiased expert assistance as necessary; impartially
exercise independent judgment in determining the facts and the
law;
keep the court and the public informed;
respect the supervising court’s authority to direct and manage the
investigation and its costs; and
keep his investigation within reasonable bounds in terms of
scope, costs, and duration in light of the private stakes, the public
interest, and the potential negative impact of the investigation on
any pending reorganization.

Moreover, an examiner has a duty to the court and the public to make his
methods and his findings transparent and to set forth conscientiously his full
and honest professional opinions based on diligent investigation and
research.
This conception of the inquisitorial examiner’s role has ethical
implications for the conduct of these investigations that varies from the
duties imposed on advocates, judges, and mediators in significant ways:


With no client to obtain waivers from, conflict of interest rules
must be drawn narrowly to ensure impartiality rather than
loyalty.55 Those narrower duties, however, may extend into the
future after the examination is over. Examiners are disqualified
from future representation of parties in the proceedings or related
matters to guard against the prospect of future employment
opportunities affecting the examination itself.56

55. See generally Daniel J. Bussel, No Conflict, 25 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 207 (2012)
(criticizing expansive loyalty-based construction of American lawyers’ conflict of interest
rules).
56. Modern American lawyers’ ethical codes draw sharp distinctions between present
and former clients. Duties to the client, particularly with respect to the representation of

2084

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW









[Vol. 84

Transparency, not confidentiality, takes center stage. Examiners
must make disclosures that other professionals are not required,
and may not be permitted, to make.
Examiners should generally be immune from malpractice or
other civil liability, placing even greater pressure on internal
ethical constraints and ongoing court supervision.
The proper scope of privileges must reflect the special
relationships between the examiner and the bankruptcy estate and
the examiner and his retained professionals, and it must limit
opportunities for strategic manipulation of the examination by
the parties in order to obtain advantages in subsequent litigation.
Delegation must be limited. The examiner is selected and
employed because his personal credibility will be attached to the
report finding the facts and setting forth his legal analysis.
The obligations of the examiner vis-à-vis the supervising court,
the parties, and the witnesses vary from the ordinary expectations
in the adversary system. Inquisitorial evidence gathering permits
ex parte proceedings, informal questioning, and disregard of
evidentiary rules. These special privileges, however, must be
subject to recognition of limited participatory rights, for the
parties to protect due process values, and to a commitment to fair
treatment of witnesses. The legal rights and privileges of both
parties and witnesses must be honored, of course, but these duties
to ensure fairness to the parties and witnesses extend beyond
narrowly protecting their clearly established legal rights.
The examiner must exercise sound discretion in determining the
scope, timing, and cost of the investigation in light of the effect
of the investigation on the overall proceeding and the interests of
the parties and the public.
III. SPECIFIC ETHICAL ISSUES

Part III offers more detailed observations on specific ethical issues raised
by inquisitorial examiners under five categories: (a) due process concerns;
(b) ex parte witness examination; (c) privileges and quasi-judicial
immunity; (d) duties to the court and public; and (e) maintaining
impartiality.
A. Due Process Values
The historic Achilles heel of inquisitorial process is its due process
deficit.57 Examiners can ensure a better and a better-accepted process by
potentially conflicting interests, are limited once the engagement has concluded. In the
examiner context, however, the Bankruptcy Code quite clearly bars an examiner from
serving as a trustee or counsel for the trustee in the case even after the conclusion of the
examination. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 321(b), 327(f) (2012).
57. American courts sometimes conflate due process with adversarial justice. See, e.g.,
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541, 547–49 (1961) (holding involuntary confessions are
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inviting the parties to define the claims and defenses at issue, offer evidence
in support of their positions on those claims and defenses, and offer
suggestions about witnesses, documents, and lines of inquiry for the
examiner to investigate. As the investigation proceeds, there is nothing
wrong with going back to the parties, informing them of what has been
found, and asking for further suggestions.
To be sure, the alternative of fixing fair rules and then letting the parties
duke it out under the supervision of a neutral umpire is one vision of due
process rooted in the common law tradition.58 Rules governing adversary
litigation may do a better job of respecting the parties’ autonomy and
ensuring an even-handed fight between them than any form of inquisitorial
process, at least if the parties are well represented and have comparable
resources. Due process values, however, can still be honored (perhaps as
well—perhaps only sufficiently to pass constitutional muster) by adopting
the perspective of the inquisitorial model. We can learn from modern
European civil procedure in this regard.59
B. Deposing Witnesses and Regulating Ex Parte Contacts
The examiner may compel production of evidence and confront and
reconfront witnesses as the investigation proceeds, recalling them as
necessary. Witness interviews should be conducted in the European mode.
The examiner should control all questioning, and traditional party crossexamination should be prohibited. The examiner should feel free to take
narrative testimony and free the interview process from technical
evidentiary rules (while preserving any evidentiary objections that may
exist for a future adversary process if necessary). Discussion among the
witness(es),60 the examiner, his counsel, and the witness’s counsel—as
opposed to strict question and answer—may be conducive to getting at the
truth. Requiring oaths and stenographic recording should be at examiner
discretion. There may be situations where the only way to obtain witness
cooperation is to go off the record. But in general, there are notable
advantages to having the witness under oath and on the record. It
eliminates quibbling about the accuracy or completeness of notes, aids the
examiner in preparing and documenting his report, and is consistent with
due process values. Moreover, the background threat of a perjury
prosecution may dissuade witnesses who might otherwise be inclined to
disallowed under the Due Process Clause because “ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system”). Adversarial trial is often viewed as the benchmark against which due
process is measured. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (suggesting
that due process may dictate “that a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is
necessary”). But see Kessler, supra note 44, at 1181 (“[C]ontrary to our tendency to view
inquisitorial procedure as unfair, equity procedure was deeply committed to due process.”).
58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
59. See Kessler, supra note 44, at 1267–70 (discussing French principe du
contradictoire); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 824 (1985) (“[B]y assigning judges rather than lawyers to investigate the facts, the
Germans avoid the most troublesome aspects of our practice.”).
60. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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distort the facts or not reveal the whole truth. The examiner must ensure
that the informal and ex parte nature of the witness interviews are not
exploited to take unfair advantage of the witness, particularly a witness not
represented by counsel at the interview.61
C. Privileges
The unique position of inquisitorial examiner raises a series of important
questions concerning the proper scope and application of privileges and
judicial immunity.
1. The Debtor’s Privileged Material
Perhaps the most contentious methodological issue raised by inquisitorial
examinations is whether the examiner, like a bankruptcy trustee,62 will have
access to the debtor’s privileged communications and work product63 and
61. Many of these same ethical issues are raised by administrative investigations, but
unfortunately there seems to be scant authority or commentary dealing with the proper
conduct of such investigations or setting prudential or ethical boundaries. Of course, the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments serve as outer boundaries on administrative investigative
discretion, but Congress appears to have imposed few additional limits. See RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 275 (5th ed. 2010); see also id. at 276–77
(“What has happened, in broad perspective, is that regulatory agencies operating under such
statutes have obtained essentially all the information they have sought from private parties.
The barriers to reasonable investigation vanished through Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). Agencies now conduct investigations to make rules, to
determine policy, to recommend legislation, and to illuminate areas in order to find out
whether something should be done and if so what.”). The breadth of these statutory powers
and the penalties attached to defiance are such that ordinarily most agencies are able to
obtain most of the information that they desire from private parties on a voluntary basis.
PIERCE, supra, at 275.
Moreover, modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on
administrative searches is highly deferential, affording agencies wide discretion to conduct
warrantless searches on less than probable cause at least in the increasingly large number of
pervasively regulated industries or in matters touching on the ever-expanding domain of
national security. Id. at 302–03. Fifth Amendment protections have also weakened over time
in the administrative context. Id. at 315–16 (“Six main ways around the privilege against
self-incrimination have cut down the protection to a smaller and smaller area with respect to
compulsory production of records. The following six sections of the treatise deal with the
six ways of reducing the protection with respect to records. The six are: (1) Records of
corporations and other organizations, even including a partnership of three partners, are not
subject to the privilege. (2) One person’s records in the custody of another person may be
denied the privilege. (3) Records of a person ‘not compelled to do anything’ may be used.
(4) A person given immunity may be compelled to be a witness against himself. (5)
Records required to be kept are outside the privilege. (6) Compulsory reporting is often
permissible.”).
62. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
63. This discussion assumes a corporate debtor. Corporations may assert attorney-client
privilege, but the privilege is controlled by the corporation’s incumbent management at the
time access or waiver is sought. See id. at 348 n.4. See generally Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Future management thus have access and control over
privileged documents and communications relating to legal advice obtained by prior
management. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 343 (“New managers installed as a result of a
takeover, merger, loss of confidence by shareholders, or simply normal succession, may
waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications made by former officers
and directors.”). The bankruptcy trustee’s control of the corporate privilege is therefore only
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the authority to publicly disclose privileged material.64 Bankruptcy
trustees, of course, directly control the corporate debtor’s privilege. The
U.S. Supreme Court has held:
In seeking to maximize the value of the estate, the trustee must investigate
the conduct of prior management to uncover and assert causes of action
against the debtor’s officers and directors. . . . It would often be
extremely difficult to conduct this inquiry if the former management were
allowed to control the corporation’s attorney-client privilege and therefore
to control access to the corporation’s legal files. To the extent that
management had wrongfully diverted or appropriated corporate assets, it
could use the privilege as a shield against the trustee’s efforts to identify
those assets. The Code’s goal of uncovering insider fraud would be
substantially defeated if the debtor’s directors were to retain the one
management power that might effectively thwart an investigation into
their own conduct.65

For examiners to credibly exercise the trustee’s investigative powers,
they too require access to the debtor’s privileged material. Such access
places an investigative examiner in a position comparable to the trustee or
debtor in possession who would otherwise be doing the investigating.66
Weighing on the opposite side of the privilege debate is the fact that,
unlike a trustee, an investigative examiner does not ordinarily step into the
shoes of management and oust the board of directors.67 During the course
of the examination, the debtor’s management and board remains in place
and continues to have access to, and control over, the debtor’s privileged
material.
An investigative examiner’s position with respect to privileged material
is analogous to that of outside counsel engaged by a corporation to conduct
an independent investigation. Such counsel has access to privileged
material on the authority of the board—that access may greatly facilitate
and inform the investigation—but counsel does not control the privilege,
and the disclosure of privileged material to such counsel is not a waiver.68
Nor may such counsel disclose privileged material without obtaining client
or judicial authority.69

a special, albeit particularly harsh, application of the general principles governing the
assertion of the corporate privilege. Different issues are raised in the case of debtors who are
natural persons.
64. Cf. A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate Reorganizations, 93
MINN. L. REV. 875 (2009) (suggesting management be disinterested and able to protect the
interests of all parties to the bankruptcy). See generally Jeffery A. Deller, Examining the
Examiner: Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Outer Limits of an Examiner’s
Powers in Bankruptcy, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 187 (2005).
65. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 353–54.
66. See supra note 63.
67. See supra note 63.
68. A contrary rule finding waiver merely by confidential disclosure to the examiner
could potentially severely disadvantage the bankruptcy estate in the event that the subject
matter of the investigation evolves into future litigation with nondebtor defendants.
69. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r.r. 1.6(a), (b)(6).
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So too an examiner. He should have unfettered access to the debtor’s
privileged material,70 but his access to the material should not be deemed a
waiver of the privilege, nor should he be permitted to disclose the material
to others without the debtor’s consent. If the debtor objects to examiner
access to privileged material, which the examiner believes essential to the
credibility of his investigation, the issue, like other privilege disputes, must
be brought to the court’s attention on a confidential basis.71 Similarly, the
court will have to resolve disputes between the examiner and the debtor
over subsequent disclosure of privileged material essential to support the
examiner’s findings in his report.
2. Internal Work Product and
Communication with Examiner Professionals
Perhaps the greatest strength of the inquisitorial model is that it avoids
the sometimes absurd and often troubling adversary “battle of the experts.”
Examiners employ unconflicted experts of their choosing who are
responsible to them and not the parties.72 Examiners and their counsel must
be able to maintain confidential communications with their experts. Those
experts’ preliminary work product, like that of the examiners’ attorneys and
other advisors, should be treated as privileged work product with the
privilege held directly by the examiner and not the debtor.73 To the extent
that examiners rely on experts’ opinions in formulating their own findings
and conclusions, however, the basis for those expert opinions should be
disclosed in their reports and public supporting documentation.

70. Nothing in this discussion is intended to suggest that the appointment of an examiner
somehow waives privileges of nondebtor parties or grants the examiner access to privileged
material of nondebtor parties that would not otherwise be subject to subpoena.
71. In Tribune, and presumably other cases, the parties finessed the debtor’s privilege
issues through a process whereby the debtor would broadly deny access to privileged
material but then selectively disclose privileged documents to Klee and his professionals at
his specific request on a case-by-case basis. These arrangements successfully avoided
litigation between Klee and Tribune over privilege issues. See Bussel, supra note 1
(manuscript at 93 n.288). In In re Enron Corp., No. 01-BR-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec.
21, 2001), the court gave the examiner authority to waive Enron’s privileges at the time of
appointment. Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated
Confidentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 381, 443–44 (2005).
72. See supra note 47.
73. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (as amended in 2010, to extend work product privilege
to materials and communications prepared by testifying expert). Attempts by parties and
government authorities to obtain examiner work product by subpoena have been litigated
and rejected in a few cases. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414, 428, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying discovery of examiner work product); In re Baldwin-United
Corp., 46 B.R. 314 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); United States v. Rice, No. 03-0093 (S.D. Tex.
2003); see also Viet. Veterans Found. v. Erdman, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16952 (D.D.C.
Mar. 19, 1987) (disqualifying examiner as witness in subsequent proceeding). Note that ex
parte examiner communications with the court are generally forbidden, FED. R. BANKR. P.
9003(a), and accordingly, such communications should be on the record and not subject to
any work product privilege.
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3. Barton Status and Immunities
Examiner independence is as critical as judicial independence to the
credibility and fairness of the process. Parties should not be able to threaten
an examiner with suit or onerous discovery when dissatisfied with his
findings or use him as a pawn in post-investigation negotiations or
litigation. Subjecting examiners to harassment through discovery or suits
will discourage qualified individuals from serving in future cases.
If a party has concerns about the examiner’s report, it should bring its
complaint to the bankruptcy judge in the form of demanding a review of the
examiner’s findings and conclusions employing traditional adversary
process in accordance with the rules governing review of a report and
recommendation.74 Examiners should receive not only the protection of the
Barton v. Barbour75 doctrine, requiring that a party seeking to sue a courtappointed receiver must first obtain leave of the appointing court, but also
quasi-judicial immunity for all acts taken in their investigative capacity.76
A court-appointed examiner conducting an investigation and reporting back
to the court and the parties is clearly exercising a judicial function. In filing
a public report and publishing a supporting investigative record of exhibits,
the examiner fulfills his responsibility to the court, parties, and public in
making the facts available. Beyond that, absent truly exceptional
circumstances, further discovery of the examiner is neither necessary nor
appropriate.77

74. But see supra note 53.
75. 104 U.S. 126 (1881); see also Muratore v. Darr, 375 F.3d 140, 147 (1st Cir. 2004);
SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 460 B.R. 106, 116 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[The
Barton] doctrine has become a black letter one.”). The Barton doctrine has expanded
beyond receiverships to include bankruptcy trustees and other bankruptcy court-appointed
fiduciaries, with the effect of immunizing those fiduciaries from suit outside their
supervising court. See, e.g., In re VistaCare Grp., 678 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2012) (Chapter
7 trustee); In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2002) (standing Chapter 13 trustee); see also
ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 43 (recommending codification and extension of Barton
doctrine to estate neutrals).
76. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1993) (test for quasijudicial immunity); In re Cedar Funding, Inc., 419 B.R. 807, 821–823 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009)
(conferring quasi-judicial immunity on bankruptcy trustee for torts committed in his
investigative capacity); Castillo, 297 F.3d at 950 (holding that a bankruptcy trustee
exercising judicial functions is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity). Bankruptcy trustees, of
course, perform many nonjudicial tasks in operating the debtor’s business and managing its
property and do not enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity when acting in that capacity. See
28 U.S.C. § 959 (2012) (trustee’s capacity to be sued and duty to obey applicable
nonbankruptcy law); 11 U.S.C. § 323(b) (trustee’s capacity to sue and be sued). To the
extent that an examiner is given expanded powers under 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b) that encompass
comparable noninvestigative duties, then his liability should track that which is imposed on a
bankruptcy trustee.
77. See, e.g., In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 558, 566 (Bankr. D. Del.
2009) (approving examiner’s transfer to liquidating trustee of evidentiary materials for use in
future liquidation); In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. 314, 316–17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985) (“[T]he Examiner, as a nonparty to any proceeding and a nonadversarial officer of the
Court, is entitled to some immunity from the whirlwind of litigation commonly attendant to
large Chapter 11 cases.”).
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D. Duties to the Process and the Public
Examiners also are obligated to protect the interests of the public in
assuring impartial, transparent, and cost-effective investigation.
1. Exercise Impartial Independent Judgment on the Merits
The examiner must reach and communicate his findings and conclusions
on the key disputed factual and legal issues so that the parties and the court
understand how the examiner, having concluded his investigation, would
resolve the matter. The In re Revco, D.S., Inc.78 model of using examiners
to simply weed out legally meritless claims and defenses fails to make
adequate use of the power of inquisitorial investigation to resolve
disputes.79
2. Transparency
Transparency is a key advantage of examiner investigations over
settlement and litigation. The examiner’s report together with the crucial
supporting evidence should be publicly available except in extraordinary
circumstances or to protect privileges as discussed above.80 An examiner’s
investigation should result in a public, fully documented written report
describing what he did, what he found, and what he thinks it means. If the
examiner is a sophisticated neutral, and given sufficient resources to
employ the requisite professionals to assist him, the public receives a
thorough, objective analysis of what happened and the resulting legal
implications.
As third party and public interests increase in weight, so does the value
of transparency, even apart from the social interest in the vindication of
third-party legal rights and the deterrence of future misbehavior. Fostering
a public perception that justice has been done in the context of catastrophic
business failures is an important independent value advanced by the
transparency afforded by an independent, fully disclosed investigation.
Of course, transparency alone is insufficient. The value of an examiner’s
investigation is also a function of the credibility of the examiner himself.
Certainly one can imagine corrupt inquisitorial systems where neither the
parties nor the public have confidence in the integrity of the inquisitor or his
investigation. The appointed examiner’s reputation for competence,
integrity, and disinterestedness is critical to achieving the goal of
legitimacy.

78. 118 B.R. 468, (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); In re Revco, D.S., Inc., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS
2966 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 1990).
79. See Bussel, supra note 1 (manuscript at 36–39 & nn.115–30) (discussing the Revco
model); supra note 1 and accompanying text.
80. See text accompanying notes 62–73; Bussel, supra note 1 (manuscript at 72 & n.233,
91–93 & nn.282–88); supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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3. Controlling Expense and Delay
Inquisitorial investigations can cost a lot of money. The examiner’s own
fees are inconsequential in the context of a large Chapter 11 case, but his
team of legal and financial professionals can be very expensive. Judges can
fix budgets for examiners and their professionals, but a credible neutral
investigation easily can cost tens of millions of dollars, and in the two
largest cases, In re Enron Corp.81 and In re Lehman Brothers Holdings,
Inc.,82 examiners incurred more than $100 million in direct fees and costs.83
Moreover, despite all hopes, these costs may actually not reduce subsequent
costs of settlement or adversary litigation if the examination fails to result
in a prompt resolution.
Expense and delay are longstanding problems for inquisitorial
investigations. In some civil law systems (such as Italy), there is a general
consensus that the civil justice system has suffered a complete breakdown
because of these factors.84 Budgets and work plans must be flexible as
investigations evolve, but courts should demand them, and continuously
monitor performance under them, to keep costs and scope under control.
But the examiner also bears responsibility for monitoring and controlling

81. No. 01-BR-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2001).
82. No. 08-BR-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008).
83. Neal Batson, the Enron examiner, and his professionals had combined fees just over
$100 million. Lipson, supra note 7, at 53 n.214. Anton Valukas, the Lehman examiner, and
his professionals also collectively charged approximately $100 million in fees and expenses.
See Final Fee Order of Mr. Valukas and Jenner & Block, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings (No.
27571) (Apr. 24, 2012) (allowing fees of $51,271,850 and expenses $7,906,417); Final Fee
Order of Duff & Phelps, In re Lehman Bros. (No. 23513) (Dec. 16, 2011) (allowing fees of
$42,340,075 and expenses $781,457). In assessing the cost of these examinations, it is
important to recognize the unprecedented scope and complexity of the Enron and Lehman
Brothers investigations. In Tribune, ResCap, and Dynegy, the investigations focused on
specific widely publicized transactions about which complaints had been raised. See Bussel,
supra note 1 (manuscript at 15). The Enron and Lehman Brothers examinations, in contrast,
were not about any specific transaction so much as they were broad-based inquiries into the
causes of two of the most shocking and sudden corporate collapses in American history.
Enron and Lehman Brothers involved businesses so complex that their own managements
did not understand the scope and magnitude of the risks that had been assumed, and the
ripple effects of their sudden catastrophic failures were of national economic importance.
Both events ultimately resulted in substantial legislative and regulatory changes, most
notoriously the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, and the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010). It is unclear how investigations of this nature fit within any traditional form of civil
legal process, adversarial or inquisitorial. They are perhaps more akin to something like the
Iran-Contra investigation or the 9/11 Commission. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM. ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004).
84. Elisabetta Silvestri, Goals of Civil Justice When Nothing Works: The Case of Italy,
in GOALS OF CIVIL JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 79–
101 (Alan Uzelac ed., 2014). Although Italy historically and popularly is classified as an
inquisitorial system, modern Italian procedure delegates the fact-gathering and presentation
processes to the parties. Id. at 94–95; see also SIMONA GROSSI & MARIA CRISTINA PAGNI,
COMMENTARY ON THE ITALIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59–60 (2010) (discussing
extensive delays in civil litigation in Italy and comparing U.S. practice). Of course, English
Chancery, with its Roman canon law methods, was also notoriously slow and costly.

2092

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

costs and preventing delay. Deadlines and budgets are important
mechanisms for imposing discipline on the process.
4. Minimizing the Threat to
Reorganization Posed by Investigation
Inquisitorial investigations also take time. Delay, and the substantive
recommendations of the examiner, may disrupt the momentum toward
confirming an otherwise desirable reorganization plan or undermine a
fragile consensus around such a plan. (Of course, adversary litigation is
likely to be even more disruptive.) When value-maximizing transactions
are available, holding them in abeyance pending an investigation may be
undesirable or impractical. Moreover, doing so may shift the focus of the
case to litigation rather than more constructive and forward-looking legal
and financial solutions to business failures. Investigation may breed, rather
than resolve, litigation and impede more constructive reorganization efforts.
Examiners must be sensitive to these potential costs and exercise internal
restraint or seek guidance from the supervising court when it appears these
costs are mounting. Perhaps most importantly, examiners (and their
supervising courts) can mitigate this risk by expediting their work.
5. Inspector Javert Risk85
An independent examiner investigating one case to the exclusion of all
other professional activity, and given ample resources to do so, may fall
victim to overzealousness. Judges and parties considering examiner
appointments may fear that the examiner will over investigate and expend
resources and delay resolution of the case beyond what is appropriate in
obsessive pursuit of a narrow investigative agenda.
In this regard, the experience under Title VI of the Ethics in Government
Act of 197886 is a cautionary tale. The statute was passed in the wake of
the Watergate scandal to ensure independent federal criminal investigations
and, when appropriate, prosecutions of high-level government officials.87
Although it survived a constitutional challenge on separation of powers
grounds,88 by the end of the 1990s, the statute was widely criticized as
overused, lacking sufficient oversight of investigating counsel, and
spawning investigations that were sometimes wasteful, unnecessary,
inconsistent with the larger public interest, and fundamentally unfair to
those targeted.89
85. Inspector Javert was the obsessive police inspector antagonist in Victor Hugo’s Les
Misérables.
86. 28 U.S.C §§ 591–599 (1999) (as amended following reauthorization in 1994 and
subsequently terminated in accordance with its terms under 28 U.S.C. § 598).
87. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
88. See id. at 685–97.
89. KATY J. HARRIGER, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 233, 245 (2d
ed. 2000) (reviewing critiques and possible solutions and concluding “[t]wenty criminal
investigations in twenty years that have served to weaken the presidency of each one who
has served under this regime and to further undermine the public confidence in government

2016]

ETHICS FOR EXAMINERS

2093

Bankruptcy examiners are subject to significant constraints inapplicable
to the independent counsels that mitigate the risk of overzealousness.
Bankruptcy courts impose work plans and budgets on examiners and must
More generally,
review all professional fees for reasonableness.90
bankruptcy courts are deeply engaged in managing the large and active
bankruptcy cases before them and thus exercise considerably more
supervisory authority over their appointed examiners than the Court of
Appeals appointing independent counsels ever would.91 Examiners do not
have the awesome responsibility of administering federal criminal law with
the concomitant leverage and potential for abuse it confers over targets and
witnesses. Moreover, examiners’ reputational interests as members of the
bankruptcy professional community may limit incentives to over
investigate.92 Nevertheless, the eye-popping fee applications submitted by
examiners in Enron and Lehman Brothers drew significant criticism going
to the scope, length, and cost of the investigations.93 Although bankruptcy
examiners may, by their nature and circumstances, be less likely to fall into
Inspector Javert mode than independent criminal prosecutors, the risk of
overzealous investigation remains a concern. In supervising examiners,
courts must remain sensitive to this risk, and examiners should be vigilant
and self-aware in guarding against becoming Javert.

are surely evidence of a weighing of values that is out of kilter”); CHARLES A. JOHNSON &
DANETTE BRICKMAN, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL: THE LAW AND THE INVESTIGATIONS 223, 247
(2001) (discussing critiques of the independent counsel statute and noting that by 1999, “[the
law] had little support among the general public, in Congress, and from the Clinton
administration, as the issues of costs, accountability, and abuse of power overwhelmed the
discussion”). But see Julian A. Cook III, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Premature
Demise, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1367 (defending statute).
90. See, e.g., Agreed Order Directing the Appointment of an Examiner, In re Tribune
Co., No. 08-BR-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 20, 2010) (requiring examiner to submit for
court approval of work plan and budget); Omnibus Order Approving Final Fee Applications
for Kenneth N. Klee, the Examiner, and His Professionals, In re Tribune Co. (Oct. 22, 2010).
91. JOHNSON & BRICKMAN, supra note 89, at 81–85 (discussing supervisory role of D.C.
Circuit after appointment of independent counsel).
92. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125,
156, 195 (1990) (discussing constraints of legal culture on members of the national
bankruptcy community). To the extent the examiner selected is not a regular member of the
bankruptcy community, these reputational constraints may diminish.
93. See Bussel, supra note 1 (manuscript at 77 n.249) (noting that examiners in Enron
and Lehman Brothers each incurred in excess of $100 million in fees and expenses); see also
Krista R. Fuller, Chapter 11 Examiner: The Basics and Successfully Fulfilling the Position,
24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 58–59 (2005); Lipson, supra note 7, at 53 n.214; Eric Berger,
Enron Lawyer’s Inquiry Is Called “Overkill”, HOUSTON CHRON. (May 6, 2003),
http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/May-5-Enron-lawyer-s-inquiry-is-calledoverkill-2131096.php [perma.cc/NFP4-UCNU].
The fees of the examiner and his
professionals in ResCap came in at over $83 million and also drew some negative
comments. See Joseph Checkler, ResCap Liquidator Bashes Fees of Examiner’s Lawyers,
Advisees, DAILY BANKR. REV., June 17, 2014.
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E. Maintaining Impartiality and Avoiding Conflicts of Interest
Finally, examiners must avoid the appearance of impropriety that stems
from holding material conflicting interests.
1. Conflicts Standards
By statute, all examiners must be “disinterested person[s].”94 They may
not be a creditor; equity security holder; director, officer, or employee of
the debtor; or otherwise a statutory “insider.”95 Nor may they hold interests
materially adverse to those of the estate or its creditors or equity holders, by
reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest
in the debtor, or for any other reason.96
Examiner conflicts of interest are not expressly regulated by any other
rule or ethical standard, although as a matter of prudence, examiners have
filed verified statements under Rule 201497 disclosing any “connection” to
the debtor, creditors, other parties in interest, other professionals involved
in the case, and the U.S. Trustee.98
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(d) (2012).
95. See id. § 101(14) (defining “disinterested person”); id. § 101 (31) (defining
“insider”).
96. See id. § 101(14); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 5002 (prohibiting appointments of
examiners related to appointing court or applicable U.S. Trustee office or in circumstances
otherwise creating an appearance of impropriety).
97. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014. The rule on its face applies to only prospective lawyers,
accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, agents, or other professionals employed under §§ 327,
1103, and 1114. Id. Examiners are appointed pursuant to § 1104 and not employed under
any of the sections identified in Rule 2014. Moreover, the examiner’s professionals are
employed under § 105(a) and not § 327. See In re Tighe Mercantile, Inc., 62 B.R. 995, 999–
1000 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986). Rule 2014’s failure to require disclosures expressly for
examiners and their professionals may simply be an oversight; examiners and examiner
professionals filing verified statements under the Rule seem to assume that is the case. On
the other hand, I am not aware of any routine practice of trustees who do not employ their
own law firms as counsel filing verified statements under Rule 2014, although the trustee’s
professionals are expressly subject to the standards of § 327 and Rule 2014. See 11 U.S.C
§ 327; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014. Regardless of whether Rule 2014 as drafted applies to
examiners and their professionals, from a policy perspective it seems sensible to subject
examiners (at least examiners who are practicing lawyers) to the same disclosure
requirement as debtor’s counsel or committee counsel. Even unrelated matter connections
might raise legitimate concerns about an examiner’s independence that might compromise
the credibility of the investigation. For example, an examiner might not appear impartial if
his law firm received a substantial portion of its revenue from a party whose conduct he was
to investigate (even if that revenue was derived entirely from unrelated matters and no
relevant confidential information existed).
98. It has never been entirely clear under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(C) what sort of
“connection with . . . the debtor” constitutes a disqualifying interest “materially adverse to
the [estate, creditors or equity holders]” other than falling within the statutory definition of
“insider.” Rule 2014 requires disclosure of all connections, not only disqualifying
connections within the meaning of § 101(14)(C), and requires disclosure of connections to
all parties in interest and the U.S. Trustee, as well as the parties named in the statute. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 2014. The disinterestedness requirement has drawn criticism on account of its
breadth and vagueness. See Harvey R. Miller & Michele J. Meises, Disinterestedness—the
Chapter 11 Paradigm!, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 359, 359 (1998) (noting the “massive
confusion and expense caused by misuse of this elusive concept” and questioned whether the
requirements adds “anything of value” to bankruptcy case administration). But see Todd J.

2016]

ETHICS FOR EXAMINERS

2095

The disinterestedness standard, not unlike the common law standard
governing judicial recusal, focuses on competing financial interests held by
the professional seeking to be employed that may be adverse to the
bankruptcy estate or any creditors or shareholders.99 Traditionally, any
financial interest no matter how minor might disqualify a judge, but other
sorts of connections to the parties, their professionals, or the matter sub
judice would not force recusal, although they might be a basis for voluntary
recusal.100 Modern codes of judicial conduct are framed in broader terms,
requiring recusal in the event that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.101 Prior involvement in the matter sub judice or close
personal or professional relationships with the litigants or their
professionals, as well as a financial interest, generally requires recusal
under these codes.102
Examiners in the inquisitorial setting103 are closer to judges than
lawyers.104 Conflict rules should focus on ensuring impartiality, not
loyalty. Moreover, as many commentators have noted, ethical rules crafted
for ordinary adversary litigation fit awkwardly in the bankruptcy context.105
Zywicki, Mend It, Don’t End It: The Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement
for Debtor in Possession’s Professionals, 18 MISS. C. L. REV. 291 (1998) (defending
disinterestedness requirement).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (defining “disinterested person”).
100. See Between the Parishes of Great Charte & Kennington, 93 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1108
(K.B. 1726) (ruling “that a party interested could not be a Judge”); Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77
Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1609) (ruling that a panel of judges could not impose fines that
they themselves profited from); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605,
611–12 (1947) (“English common law practice at the time of the establishment of the
American court system was simple in the extreme. Judges disqualified for financial interest.
No other disqualifications were permitted.”); Note, Disqualification of a Judge on the
Ground of Bias, 41 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1927) (“By the common law the slightest pecuniary
interest would disqualify a judge.”); cf. Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363,
1371 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the appearance of justice is important in our system and
the [D]ue [P]rocess clause sometimes requires a judge to recuse himself without a showing
of actual bias”).
101. See infra note 102.
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1 & 2
(2010) (stating a judge “shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety,”
requiring duties be performed “impartially, competently, and diligently[,]” and noting that to
ensure impartiality and fairness to the parties, a judge “must be objective and openminded”); Ziona Hochbaum, Note, Taking Stock: The Need to Amend 28 U.S.C. § 455 to
Achieve Clarity and Sensibility in Disqualification Rules for Judges’ Financial Holdings, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1669, 1682–83 (2003) (“[28 U.S.C. § 455(a)] is a general, ‘catch-all’
provision requiring that a judge disqualify himself in any proceeding in which there is an
objective risk that he will be perceived as biased. Under this provision, it does not matter
whether the judge is actually biased. By deferring to an objective standard, subsection (a)
allows a judge to recuse herself, or an appellate court to order her recusal, without having to
actually impugn her impartiality. The appearance of bias test has been criticized, however,
on the grounds that it distracts both judges and policymakers from identifying what is and is
not unjust.”).
103. Different standards may apply, for example, if an expanded powers examiner were
prosecuting claims on behalf of the estate. See supra note 38.
104. See, e.g., supra note 29 and accompanying text.
105. See Miller & Meises, supra note 98, at 378–79; Nancy B. Rapoport, The Intractable
Problem of Bankruptcy Ethics: Square Peg, Round Hole, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 977 (2002);

2096

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Broad per se rules making any financial interest disqualifying—whether or
not material—and prohibiting “appearance” of impropriety rather than
actual bias or conflict may be unnecessary and impractical in this context.
What is most important is that the examiner be accepted as a credible,
unbiased neutral by key constituents, the court, and the public—a judgment
that is necessarily circumstance-dependent and discretionary rather than a
matter for per se disqualification rules.
2. Mediation and Investigation May Not Mix
Susheel Kirpalani’s successful intervention as mediator following his
inquisitorial examinership in Dynegy may seem an attractive model.106
Indeed, the 2015 American Bankruptcy Institute Chapter 11 Study
Commission endorsed an “estate neutral” concept, which contemplates a
court-appointed neutral performing a variety of roles including both
investigation and mediation.107
But the roles of inquisitor and mediator do not fit comfortably together.
Mediators operate under rules that enable and protect confidential
communications. Inquisitors are supposed to publish the facts they find.
Mediators may hold or express opinions on the subject matter of the
mediation, but must remain scrupulously neutral to be effective. Inquisitors
are expected not only to form their own opinions, but to take formal
positions on the matters they are charged with investigating. An inquisitor
who is mediating may be tempted not to pursue lines of inquiry that will
complicate settlement negotiations. A mediator who is investigating may
seek to defer settlement in the interest of discovering the facts. The
attitude, professional norms, and objectives of these two different types of
neutrals are widely divergent. Perhaps, as in Dynegy, after an investigation
is complete and a report is filed, the investigative examiner may be wellsituated to facilitate settlement. But it seems too much to ask an examiner
concurrently to fill both roles and, perhaps, as is the case with examiners
and trustees,108 acting in both capacities in the same case should not be
permitted at all.
Matthew L. Warren, The Continuing Lack of Guidance on Professional Retention in
Bankruptcy and Its Potential Impact on Corporate Debtors’ Retention of Adequate Legal
Counsel, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 533 (2011) (suggesting the current approach to state ethical
codes is “inconsistent and untenable, particularly with respect to large corporate debtors”);
Jessica M. Zeratsky et al., The Ethical Considerations of Representing Multiple Parties, 34
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32 (2015) (the “concept of ‘conflict’ can be much more subtle in
bankruptcy proceedings because parties’ interests are not often directly adverse to one
another”).
106. See Bussel, supra note 1 (manuscript at 56–59 & nn.181–95) (describing examiner’s
successful mediation in Dynegy); supra note 1 and accompanying text.
107. ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 32–38.
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012) (noting an examiner may not serve as trustee in same
case). In Tribune, the U.S. Trustee’s office precluded Ken Klee from serving as mediator at
the time of his initial appointment. Correspondence with Kenneth N. Klee (Sept. 1, 2015)
(on file with author). In Enron, the bankruptcy court rejected an attempt to interject the
Enron examiner, Neal Batson, into ongoing negotiations regarding an intercompany
settlement between Enron and its affiliate, Enron North America. Order Denying Motion of
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CONCLUSION
We now have a series of precedents in Tribune, Dynegy, and ResCap for
the conduct of inquisitorial investigations through court-appointed
examiners, but unfortunately no model for regulating such examiners. I
hope this Article can begin to fill that gap by providing an ethical
framework for the conduct of inquisitorial investigations in the setting of
Chapter 11.
Constructing that framework may not only improve
inquisitorial process in the large Chapter 11 cases in which we now observe
a form of inquisitorial process evolving, but also encourage new
inquisitorial modes of investigation in other areas where the existing
options of settlement or adversary litigation are inadequate or problematic.
Query whether our engrained adversarial legal culture can meaningfully
export this mode of investigation, however successful in Chapter 11, to
other realms. But perhaps a well-defined and well-regulated inquisitorial
model for Chapter 11 investigations can serve as a template for parties who
wish to experiment with that model in arbitration settings or other kinds of
complex civil litigation.

the Baupost Group LLC and Racepoint Partners LP for an Order Directing the Appointment
of an Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003).
Mr. Batson had opposed the motion for many of the reasons discussed above. Response of
Neal Batson, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003).

